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LABOR LAW
By Richard R. Boisseau* and David C. Palmer**

I.

A.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The Russian Embargo Cases

Most noteworthy of the labor cases presented to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit during 1980 were two cases involving the boycott by the Interntional Longshoremen's Association (ILA) of
cargo destined for the Soviet Union. In Baldovin v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association,1 the court held that the ILA's boycott could not
be enjoined preliminarily under the secondary boycott provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' In the companion case, New Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, Local 1418,3
the court held that the ILA's boycott could be enjoined to enforce an
arbitration award ordering the discontinuation of the work stoppage, but
that injunctive relief against the boycott was not available prior to a final
arbitration award.
The events leading to the ILA boycott began with President Carter's
announcement on January 4, 1980, that, under authority granted by the
*

Partner in the firm of Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia. Drexel University (B.S.

1968); Temple University (J.D. 1974). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia. Cornell University (B.S.
1976); Emory University (J.D. 1979). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
Prefatory Note: The following federal statutes are within the scope of this article: LaborManagement Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1976); The Railway Labor
Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976); The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976); The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-276a-5 (1976); The
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976); and the Vietnam Era
Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976). The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624 (1976) is not within the scope of this year's Labor
Law survey. This Act and the cases applying the Act are discussed in the Employment
Discrimination survey.
1. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i), (ii)(B), (e) (1976).
3. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3722 (Mar. 31, 1981).

1085

1086

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Export Administration Act," exports of grain to the Soviet Union would
be halted or reduced in retaliation for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter later issued orders implementing the embargo against grain shipments to the Soviet Union but excluded from the
embargo the outstanding amount of unshipped grain committed under a
1975 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Subsequently, ILA president Thomas U. Gleason announced a boycott
by all ILA local unions on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of all shipments
to the Soviet Union of any goods, including shipments of grain. In line
with President Gleason's announcement, the ILA adopted a resolution to
boycott any cargo bound for or coming from the Soviet Union. The object
of the ILA's action was to punish the Soviet Union for its invasion of
Afghanistan. The boycott was not motivated by any grievance against any
employer, and the ILA did not intend to gain any concessions from employers or to improve working conditions. 5
As a result of the boycott, longshoremen refused to load grain shipments bound for the Soviet Union, even though the shipments were
outside the scope of the presidential embargo. Several Farm Bureaus, on
behalf of the grain owners, thereafter filed unfair labor practice charges
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) in Texas and
Georgia alleging that the boycott constituted action against the companies with the intent to pressure the Soviet Union and therefore was a
secondary boycott prohibited by section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. In each
case, the NLRB's Regional Director determined that there was reasonable
cause to believe the charge was valid and, as required by section 10(1) of
the NLRA,7 filed a petition for temporary injunctive relief pending the
Board's final adjudication of the charge. The Baldovin case was a consolidated appeal from the granting of a section 10(1) preliminary injunction
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
and the denial of a section 10(1) injunction by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
The Fifth Circuit in Baldovin first addressed whether the ILA's boycott
was "secondary" within the meaning of the NLRA. This turned on
"whether the union's concern [was] with the labor relations of the employer against whom its pressures are directed vis-a-vis its own employees
(protected 'primary' activity) or whether the activity [was] 'tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere' (prohibited 'secondary' activity)." s Because it was undisputed that the ILA's boycott was based on
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (Supp. III 1979).
626 F.2d at 458-59.
29 U.S.C. § 158(B)(4)(i), (ii)(B)(1976).
29 U.S.C. 160(l)(1976).
626 F.2d at 449.
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the union's dispute with the Soviet government, rather than with any affected employer, the court concluded that the boycott was "secondary"
within the meaning of the NLRA.'
The court then considered whether the Board's jurisdiction under the
NLRA, which extends only to activities "affecting commerce," reached
secondary boycotts having foreign policy objectives. Seeking an appropriate test to determine if the Board had jurisdiction over a boycott having
substantial domestic effects but one which was directed solely at foreign
entities, the court summarized a line of Supreme Court cases beginning
with Benz v. Naviera Hidalgo.10 In Benz, the Supreme Court held that
picketing of foreign ships by American unions in support of striking foreign crews of foreign ships who were engaged in a labor dispute with their
foreign shipowner-employers was outside the coverage of the NLRA.
Later, in Windward Shipping (London), Ltd. v. American Radio Association,"' the Supreme Court held that the Board's jurisdiction did not extend to secondary activity aimed at employment conditions for nonAmerican seamen aboard Liberian vessels. The Court concluded that,
when the object of secondary boycott activity is not primarily to benefit
American employees but to affect the affairs of foreign persons, the activity is not one "affecting commerce." In the subsequent case of American
Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship Association," the Supreme Court
held that, when the primary dispute is between a union and foreign shipowners, there is no basis for jurisdiction under the NLRA, regardless of
the effect on domestic businesses of the union's picketing of foreign
vessels.
Comparing the facts in Baldovin with Windward and Mobile, the Fifth
Circuit found that the ILA's activities in this instance were even further
removed from the type of domestic labor relations that the NLRA was
intended to cover, stating:
When the dispute is over the hiring of American labor in United States
ports, it is "in commerce." When the dispute is over the foreign vessels'
relations with its foreign employees, it is not "in commerce." When the
dispute is over a foreign government's invasion of a remote nation, it is
more emphatically not "in commerce."1 s
Thus, although the boycott was "secondary," the court held that it was
not reasonable to believe that the Board had jurisdicton to enjoin such a
secondary boycott, and that preliminary relief under section 10(1) was
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
353
415
419
626

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
F.2d

138 (1957).
104 (1974).
215 (1974).
at 453.
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therefore unwarranted. 1 4
In the other case dealing with the ILA boycott, New Orleans Steamship Association, the Fifth Circuit considered the rights of American employers to obtain injunctive relief against the boycott under the terms of
collective bargaining agreements. The case before the Fifth Circuit was a
consolidated appeal of a decision of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing three arbitration awards
against unions and a decision of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida compelling arbitration and enjoining the boycott pending arbitration.
In the case arising in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the employers
had sought enforcement of identical no-strike clauses through arbitration
after employees had refused to load a Soviet-bound grain shipment that
was not covered by the presidential embargo. In each of three arbitrations, the arbitrators had issued "cease and desist" orders, but the orders
differed in their terms. One arbitrator made his order applicable to any
work stoppage concerning grain or other goods having a United States
export license and thus outside the scope of the presidential embargo.
The other two arbitrators limited their orders to loading or unloading of
exempt grain aboard the specific ships that had been subjects of the disputes taken to arbitration. When the unions ignored the arbitration
awards and persisted in their participation in the boycott, the employers
sought and obtained injunctive relief in the Eastern District of Louisiana
enforcing the arbitration awards. In contrast to the awards directed at
specific ships and cargo, however, the order of the district court enjoined
the unions from engaging in, inducing or in any way encouraging any
work stoppage in connection with the loading or unloading of grain destined for the Soviet Union under an export license."5
In the case arising in the Middle District of Florida, an employer association sought to compel arbitration over whether the union had violated
a no-strike clause by its refusal to load a Soviet-bound product that was
not covered by the presidential embargo. In addition, the employer association sought a temporary restraining order to halt the boycott pending
arbitration. The district court granted both the order compelling arbitra14. Id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Baldovin must be contrasted with a 1981
decision of the First Circuit in Allied Intl, Inc. v. ILA (1st Cir. 1981)(No. 80-1425). In that
case, a split panel held that the ILA's boycott, even though for the sole purpose of applying
political pressure on the Soviet Union, was "in commerce" for purposes of the NLRA. Accordingly, the employer could bring an action under Section 303 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1976), for damages arising from the ILA's unlawful secondary activities. The ILA is
considering whether to petition for certiorari in Allied Internationalto resolve the apparent
conflict between the First and Fifth Circuits. DALY LABOR Rep. No. 34 (BNA) (February 20,
1981).
15. 626 F.2d at 459-60.
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tion and the temporary restraining order enjoining the union from refusing to load the ships then in port.16
Preliminarily, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the cases had been
rendered moot by the loading and departure of the ships which had been
the subject of the arbitration awards and injunctions. The court determined that the issues raised on appeal should be decided, applying the
priciple that a case will not be regarded as moot when there is a reasonable expectation that similar cases will continue to arise but evade judicial
review because of the short duration of the challenged action. 17 The court
also rejected the unions' argument that an injunction against a boycott
having political objectives is a "prior restraint" of speech in violation of
the first amendment. The district court orders, the court noted, prohibited only a concerted work stoppage and did not prevent any individual
union member from speaking.18
The more difficult question raised in New Orleans Steamship was
whether the injunctions were in violation of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'s which prohibits the issuance of injunctions against work
stoppages in any case involving or growing out of a "labor dispute." The
court first considered whether a secondary boycott having political objectives was a "labor dispute." As to this question, the court noted two apparently inconsistent Fifth Circuit decisions. In United States Steel
Corp. v. United Mineworkers," a panel of the court had held that a
strike to achieve a political goal-to prevent the importation of South
African Coal-was a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In West Gulf and Maritime Association v. ILA,' 1 however,
a different panel, acting almost simultaneously, summarily had affirmed a
district court's finding that a union's refusal to load grain on a ship
bound for the Soviet Union could be enjoined because the boycott of Soviet-bound shipments was not a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The latter approach also had support in decisions of the
Second 2' and Fourth Circuits.' Nevertheless, the court in New Orleans
Steamship chose to follow United States Steel Corp. as the earlier and
more fully reasoned opinion, and held that the ILA boycott, though
politically oriented, was a "labor dispute" for purposes of the Norris-La.16. Id. at 460-61.
17. Id. at 461-62, citing, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Southern Pac. Term. Co. v.
ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
18. 626 F.2d at 462-63.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
20. 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976).
21. 531 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1976), af's 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
22. Khedivial Line, SAE v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1960).
23. NLRB v. ILA, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
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Guardia Act."
The court then considered whether the injunctions issued against the
unions fell within the exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for injunctions enforcing contractual obligations for such purposes as compelling
arbitration in the face of a work stoppage and restraining certain strike
activity pending arbitration.25 The injunction issued by the Middle District of Florida was found to be valid under this exception only insofar as
it compelled the union to arbitrate whether there had been a violation of
the applicable no-strike clause. The lower court's order enjoining further
strike activity pending arbitration was found invalid, however, under the
rule that a strike may be enjoined prior to arbitration only when the
strike is over a dispute which is subject to resolution through arbitration.26 Because the strike was against the Soviet Union and thus was not
over a dipsute subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining
agreement, the court vacated the Middle District of Florida's injunction
to the extent that it enjoined the strike7 pending arbitration of whether
the strike violated the no-strike clause.'
With regard to the order of the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing
arbitration awards already made, the question was whether the injunction
went beyond the terms of the arbitration awards. The court noted that,
because the district court's power to enjoin is based on the arbitrator's
award, the injunction can be no broader than the award. To go beyond
the scope of the award, the court reasoned, would be akin to giving the
award res judicata or stare decisis effect, and whether the award was entitled to such effect was itself a matter for arbitration.28 In the three cases
before the Court, the district court had enjoined all further strikes at the
port of New Orleans over the underlying dispute, whereas two of the arbitrators had carefully limited their awards so as to affect only a single vessel. The injunction based on these latter two awards was, therefore, vacated and remanded, while the court upheld the broad injunction in the
third case which was based on the equally broad arbitration award.
In sum, it appears that neither the NLRB nor an employer is entitled
to preliminary injunctive relief against secondary boycotts directed at foreign entities for political causes. While relief ultimately may be available
24.

626 F.2d at 465.

25. Id. at 465-67. See Boys Mkt, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970) (permitting injunction pending arbitration); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (permitting injunction to enforce arbitration award); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (permitting injunction compelling
arbitration).
26. 626 F.2d at 467.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 468.

1981]

LABOR

1091

through enforcement of a contractual no-strike clause or a suit for damages under section 303 of the NLRA,19 employers apparently have no recourse against a union under the law, as now interpreted by the Fifth
Circuit, in the interim between the beginning of the boycott and the rendering of a final arbitration award.
B.

Unfair Labor Practices

Concerted Activity. The facts of Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB3 0 raised
the question of whether an employee's request for union representation at
an investigatory interview, after a challenged union election victory but
before certification, was protected concerted activity. Answering in the
affirmative, the court suggested by its analysis that an individual's solitary action that can be interpreted as benefiting other employees is concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA, 1 regardless of the individual's purpose.
The court first noted the rule established in NLRB v. Weingarten,
Inc.81 that an employee's request for representation by a certified or voluntarily recognized union is protected activity. Because the union was
neither certified nor recognized at the time of the interview, however,
Weingarten was not directly applicable.3 3 The court also reasoned that
had the employee requested a representative from among the employees
of the relevant bargaining unit, the request unquestionably would have
constituted concerted activity within the meaning of section 7." The record did not indicate whether the employee had requested a fellow employee and therefore, for purposes of analysis, the court assumed that the
requested representative was not an employee. 88 The court next set forth
the apparent conflict among the circuits concerning the scope of "concerted activities" protected by section 7. On one hand, the Second Circuit
has espoused a theory of constructive concerted activity, first set forth in
NLRB v. Interboro Contractors," in which the crucial inquiry is whether
an individual employee's actions will have beneficial effects on the interests of his fellow employees. On the other hand, the narrower interpretation of "concerted activities" is represented by the Third Circuit's opinion in Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB,17 which holds that
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See Allied Internationaldiscussed in note 14 supra.
618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
420 U.S. 251 (1975).
618 F.2d at 1158.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
330 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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activity by a single employee is concerted only if it is engaged in with the
"object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action or . ..
[has] some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.""
Although it ultimately found that the requests for union representation
at the disciplinary interviews in the case at hand constituted concerted
activity under either the Interboro or Mushroom Transportationdefinitions,39 the court in Anchortank nevertheless went on in dicta to state
that the Supreme Court in Weingarten had "seemingly adopted the
Interboro approach."'40
In deciding whether an employee's precertification request for union
representation at an investigatory interview had sufficient effect on the
interests of other employees to constitute concerted action, the court
noted that preelection participation of a union representative on behalf of
a single employee has at best only an incidental effect on fellow employees who have yet to select the union as their representative. "' Once the
union has won an election, however, "[tihe situation is radically altered."'" Even after a challenged election victory, an employee's request
for union participation is made "with the object of initiating or inducing
or preparing for group action .. ",' After the election victory, "the employee quite properly perceives his request to be one for the concerted
mutual aid and protection of his fellows, for the union then stands in for
all the unit employees." 4 Finding on balance that the employee's right to
union participation in this situation outweighs the employer's right to exclude nonemployees from the interview, the court concluded that the employer's refusal to allow the participation of an official of the union, assumed to be a nonemployee, was a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA.4
The implied acceptance by the court in Anchortank of the constructive
concerted activity theory of Interboro is troubling for a number of rea38. Id. at 685.
39. 618 F.2d at 1161 n.11, 1162.
40. Id. at 1161. The court analyzed Weingarten as follows:
In concluding that an employee engages in concerted activity when he seeks union
representation at an interview which he reasonably fears may lead to discipline,
the [Supreme] Court focused entirely on the effects of such representation on the
bargaining unit .... Significantly, the Court did not discuss whether the employee's action was designed to induce or prepare for group action or had some
relation to group action in the interest of the employees, as is required by
Mushroom.

Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1161-62.
Id. at 1162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1162-64. Section 8(a)(1) is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1976).
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sons. First, the court's reliance on Interboro was made unnecessary by the
court's finding that the employee's request for union aid after a representation election was made "with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group action" and was therefore concerted activity under
either the narrow or broad definition of that phrase. Second, in the Fifth
Circuit's previous decision in NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc.,"6 the
court explicitly had rejected Interboro.47 Third, the dicta in Anchortank
runs contrary to the great weight of opinion among the circuits. For while
Interboro is still followed by the Board,' 8 the Second Circuit' 9 and possibly the First Circuit, 0 six circuits have expressly declined to follow In1 and another has indicated
terboro,5
that the approach in Interboro
would not be followed if the issue were presented for decision."2 Whether
other panels of the Fifth Circuit will follow the dicta of Anchortank undoubtedly will be a question of interest for Fifth Circuit observers.
Organizational Rights-Solicitation. In Belcher Towing Co. v.
NLRB," the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co." to hold that a rule that prohibits nonemployee solicitation on the employer's premises may be overturned if
the employer discriminates against union organizers while allowing other
nonemployee solicitation or if union organizers have no reasonable alternative means to communicate with employees."5 In Belcher Towing, the
Fifth Circuit held that although the burden of proving the lack of reasonable alternatives rests with the union, the union need not demonstrate
that it has unsuccessfully attempted to utilize other means.
The employer in Belcher Towing adopted a no-solicitation rule that on
its face was nondiscriminatory. The Board, however, found the rule discriminatory as enforced and thus illegal because of evidence that the em46. 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
47. Id. at 719.
48. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 102 L.R.R.M. 1517
(1979), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304, (4th Cir. 1980); Self Cycle & Marine Distributor
Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 98 L.R.R.M. 1517 (1978).
49. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1975).
50. See Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706 (1st Cir. 1975).
51. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Slotkowski Sausage Co., 620 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1980); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718
(6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1977);
NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern
Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971).
52. Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. 614 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
55. The premise that a no-solicitation rule is invalid if it merely discriminates against
union organizers is a tenuous interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Babcock &
Wilcox. See 351 U.S. at 112-14.
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ployer had allowed access to the employer's tugs to nonemployees other
than union organizers. As an alternative ground for its decision that the
enforcement of the rule violated the NLRA, the Board had found that the
employer had failed to prove that there were reasonable alternative
means of communication for union organizers. 5"
On appeal, the court rejected both the Board's stated grounds for the
decision and refused to enforce the Board's order. The no-solicitation rule
was not discriminatory as enforced, the court held, because the evidence
showed only that certain nonemployees other than union organizers had
access to the tugs. The record contained no evidence that the employer
permitted any solicitation. 57 As for the Board's second ground for decision, that union organizers had no reasonable alternatives to solicitation
aboard the tugs, the court found that the Board had impermissibly
shifted the burden of proof to the employer. While rejecting the view of
the Second Circuit that a union must demonstrate unsuccessful efforts to
use other means," the court concluded that the union at least must bear
the burden of proving that such efforts would be unsuccessful. 69
Organizational Rights-Supervisors. Although supervisors are
excluded from the protection extended to employees under Section 7 of
the NLRA,10 their employment status may be affected by the Board because of the scope of protection accorded employees under the NLRA. e '
In NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp.," for example, the Fifth Circuit was
presented with a Board order which required that two supervisors be reinstated, based on the Board's finding that their discharges were "an integral part of a pattern of conduct aimed at penalizing employees" for organizational conduct." In refusing to enforce this portion of the Board's
order, the court rejected both the Board's theory and the General Counsel's argument that the remedial portion of the order should be affirmed
because the supervisors played "important roles" in the employees' organizational activity." Underlying either the Board's or the General Coun-

56. 614 F.2d at 89-90.
57. Id. at 90.
58. See NLRB v. New Pines, Inc., 468 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1972).
59. 614 F.2d at 91.
60. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a)(1976).
61. See e.g., NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968) (reinstated
supervisor discharged for giving testimony before the Board); Pioneer Drilling Co. v. NLRB,
391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968) (reinstated supervisor discharged as pretext for termination of
pro-union crew hired by the supervisor); NLRB v. Talladega Cotton Factory, 213 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1954) (reinstated supervisor discharged for refusing to aid employer in committing
unfair labor practice).
62. 626 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 1294-95.
64. Id. at 1295 n.8.
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sel's theory, the court explained, was the conclusion that the supervisors
were discharged for having engaged in organizational activity. As to supervisors, the court noted, it was "precisely" this kind of conduct that
Congress chose not to protect.e5
Discrimination. Applying the "but for" standard for improper motive ("to constitute an 8(a)(3)" violation, an improper motive must be a
cause without which the employee would not have been discharged"6 7),
the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce a Board finding of discriminatory discharge in Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB." The Board had concluded
that an employee's discharge resulted from his filing of a grievance despite the employer's contention that the discharge was caused by the employee's falsification of a time card.se The court found that the record also
established that the employee was discharged for violation of the employer's strict policy of discharging employees who falsified their time
cards. Because the General Counsel had failed to carry the burden of
proving that but for the employee's filing of a grievance he would not
0
have been discharged, the court refused to enforce the Board's order.7
Duty to Supply Information. In a split decision, the Fifth Circuit in
NLRB v. Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.,7 1 enforced the Board's
order requiring the employer to provide the union with wage information
relating to non-unit employees. The employer argued that it was not obligated to supply non-unit wage information until the union explained the
relevance of such information, and that when it was first notified of the
purpose of the request for information at the unfair labor practice hearing, it offered to provide the information.
The majority held that the Board's finding that the requested information was relevant (and implicitly, that the information was relevant on its
face),"5 was reasonably based in law and supported by the record in light
of the employer's past practice of maintaining wage parity between unit
65. Id. at 1295.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
67. NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 398 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1968).
68. 619 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 341-42.
70. Id. at 342. While the Board has not yet gone this far concerning the General Counsel's burden of proof in proving discrimination, the Board took a step in this direction in
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980). In that case, the Board
abandoned its traditional position that reinstatement is required if the employee's discharge
is motivated in part by his or her protected activity. Under Wright Line, the General Counsel first must make a prima facie showing that the protected conduct was a "motivating
factor" in the employer's decision to discharge the employee. The burden then shifts to the
employer to prove that the discharge would have occurred even absent the illegal reason.

71. 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 1103 (Fay, J., dissenting).
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and non-unit employees and the probability that the union would view
the recent wage increase offered non-unit employees as the floor from
which it would make its demands. 7 Dissenting, Judge Fay decried as
"shocking and unfounded" the Board's conclusion that the employer
74
should have "guessed" the relevance of non-unit wage information.
C. Pre-Hire Agreements
Under Section 8(f) of the NLRA,T an employer engaged in the building
and construction industry may make a pre-hire agreement with a labor
organization governing the terms of employment for employees who may
be hired in the future by the employer. In NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co.,7 " the Fifth Circuit held that once majority support for the union
is demonstrated among the employees in an appropriate unit employed at
the company's current projects, the pre-hire agreement matures into a
collective bargaining agreement enforceable not only as to all of the employer's current projects, but also to any future projects.
The employer, Haberman Construction Co., had operated for several
years in conformity with a collective bargaining agreement between the
contractors' association, of which it was a member, and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, without ever becoming a formal signatory to the contract. During this period, Haberman hired only union
carpenters, either through the union hiring hall or on the personal knowledge of its carpenter foreman, himself a union member. The Board found,
and the court agreed, that Haberman had adopted the union contract by
77
manifesting an intent to abide by its terms and by enjoying its benefits.
In the face of the binding contract, Haberman's subsequent repudiation
of the contract, unilateral changes in working conditions, and constructive
discharges constituted violations of sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the
NLRA.7 8 In addition to ordering make-whole relief for the employees, the
Board ordered Haberman to comply with the terms of the collective bar73. Id. at 1101. The court further found that substantial evidence supported the Board's
finding that the employer's offer to release the information at the unfair labor practice hearing did not render moot the unfair labor practice issue at trial, because the employer's offer
was not "unconditional" in light of the fact that the employer continued to maintain that it
had been under no obligation to supply the information. Id. at 1102.
74. Id. at 1103.
75. 29 U.S.C. 158(f)(1976).
76. 618 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1980). In an en banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit recently vacated the panel decision insofar as it granted enforcement to the portion of the Board's
order extending relief to projects not yet begun at the time of the employer's unfair labor
practices. DAily LABoR Rap. No. 69 (BNA) (April 10, 1981). (editor's note)
77. Id. at 293-94.
78. Id. at 295-99. Section 8(a)(5) is codified at 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5)(1976).
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gaining agreement."'
On appeal, Haberman argued that the Board's remedy was overbroad
in that it extended beyond the two projects in existence at the time of the
contract repudiation. Haberman contended that the enforceability of the
contract was dependent upon a demonstration of the union's majority
status at each project, and that there was no evidence that the union
would control a majority of the Haberman carpenters at projects not
underway at the time of contract repudiation.
The court rejected this argument and granted enforcement to the
Board's order. The general rule, the court noted, is that a union that has
demonstrated majority support within a bargaining unit enjoys a rebuttable presumption of continued majority status, 80 a rule particularly applicable to the construction industry in which employment fluctuation is inherent. 8 A fundamental principle of the Act, the court continued, is that
the employer's bargaining obligation extends not to "projects" but to a
properly defined "bargaining unit."" The important question, therefore,
was whether the carpenters employed at projects not under way at the
time of contract repudiation were properly included within the bargaining
unit with which Haberman was obliged to bargain.
In response to Haberman's argument that a pre-hire contract can mature into a collective bargaining agreement only on a project-by-project
basis, the court held that, when majority support for the union is demonstrated among the employees working on all of the employer's projects at
the time of the demonstration, the employer's obligation to bargain
attaches not to the discrete project but to the entire bargaining unit.83
Thus, the court concluded, when the pre-hire agreement matured into a
collective bargaining agreement, the union became entitled to a rebuttable presumption of majority status as to future projects, "despite both the
potential change in the bargaining unit's employee composition and its
eventual relocation to other, future projects."" The Board therefore
properly remedied Haberman's refusal to bargain by issuing a bargaining
order as to all projects within the bargaining unit.
Judge Randall concurred with the majority's holding that Haberman
had become a party to the collective bargaining agreement and had
breached the agreement, but dissented from the marjority's enforcement
of the Board's order as to projects not yet begun at the time of the unfair
labor practices. Judge Randall cited decisions of the Board indicating

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 294.
at 300.
at 301.
at 301-02.
at 311.
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that pre-hire agreements become enforceable only on a project-by-project
basis, 5 and he chastised the Board for failing to discuss or repudiate
these decisions in its opinion and order against Haberman." The appropriate action for the court to take, Judge Randall concluded, was to remand the case to the Board to require it to explain the reasons for its
7
decision.8
D.

Representation Cases

Appropriate Bargaining Units. The failure of the Board to explain
the weight assigned to factors favoring and militating against the designation of production and maintenance employees of a poultry business as an
appropriate bargaining unit led the court to remand the Board's decision
for further proceedings in NLRB v. Purnell's Pride,Inc." The employer
had argued to the Board that a larger unit including most of the employees in its vertically integrated poultry operation encompassing several locations was more appropriate. The court examined the Board's analysis of
the defined unit's "community of interest" and found that, while evidence
relevant to bargaining history, geographic proximity, employee interchange and common job function favored the unit, evidence relevant to
operational integration, common supervision and uniformity of employee
benefits was adverse to the unit.8 ' Questioning the weight apparently assigned to each factor under the facts of the case, the court held that the
Board's analysis was incomplete. "The crucial consideration," the court
explained, "is the weight or significance, not the number, of factors relevant to a particular case.""' The court also rejected the Board's undue
reliance on the "presumption" that a single plant unit is appropriate,
concluding that whether an employer's facilities are properly considered
85. Id. at 313 (Randall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Dee Cee Floor
Covering, 232 N.L.R.B. 421, 97 L.R.RIM. 1072 (1977), the Board indicated in dicta that the
achievement of majority status on previous projects does not give rise to a presumption of a
continuing majority status, because the union must demonstrate its majority at each new
project. Id. at 422. See also Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 46, 88
L.R.R.M. 1067, 1068 (1975); Roberts & Schaefer, 193 N.L.R.B. 860, 860 n.3, 78 L.R.R.M.
1412 (1971); Ruttmann Constr., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702, 77 L.R.R.M. 1497, 1498 (1971).
86. 618 F.2d at 317-18. After the Board's decision in Haberman, but before the Fifth
Circuit's Haberman decision, the Board did in fact disapprove those cases which had suggested that majority support must be established project-by-project. G. M. Masonry Co.,
245 N.L.R.B. No. 54, 102 L.R.R.M. 1542 (1979). The majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit in
Haberman relied in part on the Board's G. M. Masonry ruling to uphold the Board's earlier
order against Haberman. 618 F.2d at 308-09.
87. 618 F.2d at 318-19.
88. 609 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. Id. at 1160.

90.

Id. at 1156.
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to be a "plant" can only be determined by reference to many of the same
factors which are indicia of community of interest.' Assuming that the
Board could have found the employer's processing facility to be a plant,
the court added, the Board failed to consider the applicability of the exception to the single plant unit rule for cases in which functional integration of the plant with the operations at other facilities is sufficient to
eliminate a single plant identity."1 Thus, the court denied enforcement of
the bargaining order and remanded the case to the Board for further
consideration.
In another 1980 case concerning the delineation of an appropriate bargaining unit, North American Soccer League v. NLRB,"9 the court enforced the Board's order creating a unit composed of all professional soccer players in the League except those employed by Canadian teams. The
Board had held that the League and its member clubs were joint employers and that it was appropriate that they should be required to bargain
jointly. The court found substantial evidence to uphold the Board's conclusion that the clubs were joint employers with the League. The League
contended that it was a joint employer separately with each club and that
a league-wide unit was therefore inappropriate. The League, as support
for its contention, had relied on the Board's decision in Greenhoot, Inc."
that a building management company was a joint employer separately
with each building owner. The court responded that, unlike the building
owners in Greenhoot, each soccer club exercised some control over the
other clubs by virtue of its proportionate role and voting power in League
management."
Election Conduct. In five cases decided by the court during 1980,
Board orders concerning representation election conduct were enforced.
In NLRB v. South Mississippi Electric Power Association," the court
held that a union observer's possession of a voter eligibility list and brief
comparisons of this list to the official list during the balloting did not
create a coercive atmosphere when (1) the union observer could only have
recorded a small number of those who voted and (2) any marks made by
the union observer were made at a time when no eligible voters were in
the voting area. In NLRB v. San Antonio Portland Cement Co., 9 the
court held that a supervisor's wearing of a union button at a union meeting on the night before the election was not coercive. In Gould, Inc. v.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1160-61.
613 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 267 (1980).
205 N.L.R.B. 250, 83 L.R.R.M. 1656 (1973).
613 F.2d at 1383.
616 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1980).
611 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 127 (1980).
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NLRB,9 8 the court held that a union's pre-election statement that dues.
arrearages would be waived was not an improper promise of benefit where
the union had a longstanding policy consistent with that statement. The
court stated that a union is entitled to inform employees of its dues structure and collection procedures during an election campaign.
The court also addressed the issue of misconduct by Board officials,
finding in Skyline Corp. v. NLRB" that the failure of Board officials, after the close of balloting, to seal with tape envelopes containing ballots, as
required by the Board's casehandling manual, was not sufficient grounds
to set aside an election. Finally, in NLRB v. Manhattan Corp.,1 °0 the
court reaffirmed the rule earlier established in the Fifth Circuit that ballots containing no markings on their faces, but which are marked "no" on
their backs, are not void but should be counted as votes against
representation. 101
E. Procedure
Remedies. In Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 01 the court considered
the scope of the Board's power to order remedial action at plants other
than the plant at which an unfair labor practice was committed. In a
prior proceeding, Florida Steel had been adjudged in violation of Sections
8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA and ordered to reinstate several wrongfully
discharged employees at its plant in Croft, North Carolina. Subsequently,
the union requested information concerning the employees to be reinstated and those to be displaced by the reinstatements. After Florida
Steel resisted this request, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging violations of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA.
In the second proceeding, the Board determined that Florida Steel had
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to supply the requested
information. To remedy the effects of the unfair labor practice, the Board
ordered Florida Steel to provide promptly on request all information relevant to the union's performance of Florida Steel's obligation as a bargaining representative and to give notice of its obligation to supply information to the employees at all Florida Steel plants,-regardless of whether the
employees were represented by the United Steelworkers of America or
any other labor organization. The Board also ordered Florida Steel to
permit the union to deliver a thirty minute speech on working time at
any plant having a representation election within two years from the or98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

610 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1980).
613 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980).
620 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 54. See NLRB v. Tiche-Goettinger, 433 F.2d 1045, 1048 (5th Cir. 1970).
620 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1980).
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der, and also to grant the union equal time for reply at any plant where,
within two years, any company official should address the employees on
the subject of union representation. Florida Steel did not seriously challenge the Board's findings as to the unfair labor practices, but objected to
the scope of the Board's remedial order.
The court noted that, while the Board has great discretion under the
Act with regard to remedies, and may consider the past conduct of the
parties in forming a remedy, "[tlhe essence of the Board's order must
... , if it is to be remedial, be based upon the conduct found by the
Board to violate the Act in the current proceedings."10 s Therefore, as to
the portion of the Board's order requiring Florida Steel to post a notice in
all of its plants, whether unionized or not, informing the employees of
Florida Steel's obligations under the NLRA, the court found that the
Board had acted within its authority to take "such affirmative action...
as will effectuate the policies" of the NLRA.1 " The expansion of the order to cover nonunion plants, although "extraordinary," was justifiably
premised on the Board's finding that Florida Steel had used its earlier
unfair labor practice'at one plant as part of a campaign against unionization in other plants.106
Other parts of the Board's order, however, were neither supported by
the record nor authorized by the NLRA. The court held that the order
granting union access to all Florida Steel plants could be upheld only
with respect to plants then represented by the union. As to unionized
plants, the order was valid as a means to prevent other efforts by Florida
Steel to impair the effectiveness of the bargaining representative. 1 " The
court could perceive no remedial purpose, however, in requiring such access to plants not represented by the union. To this extent, the order was
punitive rather than remedial and therefore impermissible under the
NLRA. 107
In Chromalloy American Corp. v. NLRB,'" the court upheld the
Board's bargaining order requiring the employer to recognize and bargain
103. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
104.

Id. at 82.

105. Id. at 83.

106. Id.
107. Id. The court refused to comment as to whether an order requiring company-wide
access could be "remedial" in other cases, such as those dealing with employer violations in
connection with multi-plant organizational rights. Id., citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB,
612 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1980) (company-wide remedy upheld). Following the Fifth Circuit's
decision in FloridaSteel, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
concluded that company-wide access might be an appropriate remedy when an employer's
actions have a company-wide chilling effect. United States Steelworkers of America v.
NLRB, No. 79-2242 (D.C. Cir. February 25, 1981).
108. 620 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1980).
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with the union without a representation election. The Board found, and
the court agreed, that Chromalloy had attempted to prevent unionization
of its personnel by engaging in a series of unfair labor practices, including
threats to close down the plant, promises of benefits and discrimination.
To remedy the effects of these acts, the Board issued a bargaining order
on the ground that "no fair election can be held in the future" as a result
of Chromalloy's flagrant violations.'"
Chromalloy challenged the bargaining order on the ground that the
Board had failed to state with sufficient specificity why the bargaining
order was necessary. Although the court concurred with Chromalloy on
this point, it chose to supply the necessary analysis rather than remand
the case for additional proceedings. 0° The most important factor, in the
court's view, was Chromalloy's repeated threat to employees to shut down
the plant in the event of a union victory.' The court cited numerous
other cases in which bargaining orders had been upheld solely on the basis of such threats,"' and the court bolstered its evaluation of the seriousness of Chromalloy's practices by citing Chromalloy's other unfair labor
practices of discrimination and promise of benefits.' Still other unfair
labor practices, not subject to Board remedy because they occurred before
the statutory six month limitations period, were considered as relevant to
demonstrate Chromalloy's history of resistence to unionization4 and the
likelihood that Chromalloy would engage in future violations."
Chromalloy also argued that the bargaining order was inappropriate because of substantial turnover in the ranks of employees following the
commission of the unfair labor practices. The court agreed that certain
subsequent events, including employee turnover, are relevant to the propriety of a bargaining order, but denied that the factor of turnover was
sufficient to overcome the need for a bargaining order as disclosed by the
pervasiveness of Chromalloy's unfair labor practices." 5
Jurisdiction. In Transportation Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB," 6 the
court held that the Board may not assert retroactive jurisdiction over an
employer to remedy unfair labor practices occurring in the interim between the Board's declination of jursidction and later assertion of jurisdiction. The employer operated a shuttle bus system for students, faculty
109. Id. at 1128-29.
110. Id.at 1129-30.
111. Id.at 1130.
112. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Chemvet Laboratories, Inc. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 445, 448 (8th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. General
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 902 (2nd Cir. 1971).
113. 620 F.2d at 1130.
114. Id. at 1130-31.
115. Id.at 1131-33.
116. 630 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
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and staff at the University of Texas. In 1972, the union petitioned the
regional office of the NLRB, seeking a representative election among the
shuttle bus drivers as a bargaining unit. The regional office dismissed the
petition as an exercise of the Board's discretion to decline jurisdicton over
disputes having only a minimal effect on interstate commerce.11 7 The
union did not petition for Board review of the decision.
The company thereafter voluntarily recognized the union and entered
into a collective bargaining agreement. Prior to the expiration of that
agreement in 1976, the parties negotiated for a new contract but reached
an impasse. The union struck and filed unfair labor practice charges
against the company. The regional office, in accordance with its 1972 decision, declined jurisdiction over the charges. The union then filed a second representation petition and simultaneously withdrew its unfair labor
practice charges. The regional office made no decision on the union's second representation petition but referred the matter directly to the Board.
In February of 1977, while the representation petition was still pending,
the union refiled its unfair labor practice charges against the company.
In June, 1977, the NLRB issued its decision in the representation case
and asserted jurisdiction over the employer's shuttle bus system. The resulting certification election held the next month was won by the union.
Subsequently, the NLRB found that the company's actions in August of
1976 were unfair labor practices, and that the strike which followed was
therefore an unfair labor practice strike. The Board ordered all of the
strikers reinstated and also ordered the company to bargain with the
union as the exclusive representative of its employees.118
The company petitioned the court for review of the Board's order, contending that the Board was without power to assert retroactive jurisdiction over the unfair labor practices committed in August, 1976. The court
agreed and denied enforcement to that portion of the Board's order
awarding back pay to former strikers. The court distinguished the case
from one in which an employer acts in anticipation of a later exemption
from coverage of the NLRA. Such an employer acts at his own peril.11' By
contrast, the company's actions had occurred only after the decision of
the Regional Director to decline to assert jurisdiction. After this decision,
and before the Board's later decision to assert jurisdiction, the company
"could not technically commit unfair labor practices, as defined by the
Act . .. because it was not then subject to the Act or the Board's
overview."12 0
117.
14(c)(1)
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 423. The Board's authority to decline jurisdiction is granted by section
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
630 F.2d at 424.
Id.
Id. at 425.
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In reply to the Board's argument that the Regional Director's 1972 declination of jurisdiction was merely an "administrative determination," the
court joined the Tenth Circuit' in holding that decisions of the Regional
Director, if not set aside by the Board, are entitled to the same weight as
decisions of the Board." Thus, the 1972 decision of the Regional Director effectively removed the company from the jurisdiction of the Board
until the Board's later assertion of jurisdiction.
Collateral and Judicial Estoppel. In NLRB v. Markle Manufacturing Co., 123 the court held that the Board is not barred from charging
and attempting to prove discriminatory discharge by virtue of earlier proceedings in which, technically, the Board took an opposite position. The
Board, the company and the union had entered into a consent decree settling a complaint issued by the Board against the union for violence and
misconduct in connection with a strike. The complaint which had been
issued by the Board specifically named certain employees as having participated in misconduct. The consent order entered by the Board pursuant to this settlement agreement stipulated only the jurisdictional facts
and contained no facts concerning the union's strike misconduct. The
consent order also contained a nonadmission clause and was enforced by
the Fifth Circuit upon petition by the Board.lu
In another unfair labor practice case arising out of the same strike, the
administrative law judge determined that the strike was an economic
strike and that therefore the strikers were entitled to reinstatement if and
when vacancies occurred in their former or equivalent positions. The
company, however, offered reinstatement to only some of the strikers.
Thus, fifteen months after the enforcement of the consent decree on the
original charges, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
the company charging that it had refused to reinstate a number of economic strikers for whom positions had become available. Among the former strikers included in this group were six who had been charged with
strike misconduct in the initial settled complaint against the union. The
Board found that the company had violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the NLRA in refusing to reinstate five of the employees.125 In response to
the Board's petition to enforce its order against the company, the company contended that the Board was estopped, by virtue of the consent
order, from attempting to prove that these employees were not justifiably
denied reinstatement on grounds of misconduct.
The court ruled that the consent agreement entered in the strike mis121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1970).
630 F.2d at 426.
623 F.2d at 1122 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1125-26.
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conduct case was not a bar to relitigation of the issue of misconduct, because the earlier proceedings had never resulted in a final determination
of that matter, even though it had been the basis of the original charge.1 6
The court also rejected the company's argument that the Board was
barred from disputing the occurrence of strike misconduct by its position
in the earlier proceeding that such misconduct had in fact occurred. The
court held that neither the Board issuance of a charge at the employee's
request nor the issuance of a complaint based upon the employer's affidavits making out a prima facie case constituted a "position," because in
entering the consent order and petitioning for enforcement, the Board
had made no findings or representations of fact concerning the alleged
12 7
misconduct.

The company also argued that the Board's authority to agree to a consent order without the approval of the employer gave the Board the
power to prevent the employer from litigating at an early stage the obligation to reinstate, and that this authority should be restrained by the
doctrine of estoppel. The court responded that had the company opposed
the consent order, it could have intervened to prevent enforcement of the
order. 126 Because the company had relied in good faith on the results of
the earlier proceeding, however, the court held that the first order tolled
any duty to reinstate and any liability for back pay until entry of the
second order and granted enforcement with that proviso.1 "'
Injunctive Relief. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,180 the Norris LaGuardia Act's prohibition of injunctions against strike activities 8" does not prevent a federal
court from enjoining a work stoppage pending arbitration of the underlying dispute if that dispute constitutes an arbitrable grievance under a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union. In
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association,18 '
the Fifth Circuit held that such an injunction may not be continued beyond the time an arbitration award in favor of the union is judicially enforced. The union in Sea-Land Service went on strike over the employer's
assignment of work to competing unions. The employer sought and obtained a Boys Markets injunction against the dispute pending arbitration.
126. Id. at 1126. In Mosher Steel v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1978), the court held
that collateral estoppel was not normally applied to conclusions of law made by administrative agencies, but may be applied to facts previously adjudicated.
127. Id. at 1126-27.
128. Id. at 1127.
129. Id. at 1127-28.
130. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
132. 625 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Arbitration of the dispute resulted in an award in the union's favor, and
the employer then brought a second action in federal court to vacate the
arbitration award and filed unfair labor practice charges against the
union, alleging that the union's action constituted a violation of section
8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA. 1' In the original action by the employer for
breach of contract, inwhich the employer had obtained injunctive relief,
the union moved that the distrct court "confirm" the arbitration award.
The employer resisted this motion by moving in the second action that
both the breach of contract action and the action to vacate the award be
stayed pending NLRB resolution of the unfair labor practice charges.
At this stage, the union took the position that it desired only "confirmation" of its arbitral award and did not oppose the employer's request
for a stay of proceedings beyond "confirmation."" Nor did the union
seek to dissolve the outstanding injunction. The district court, after consolidating the actions, granted the union's motion to confirm the arbitration award, stayed further proceedings pending NLRB resolution of the
unfair labor practices charges and continued the injunction. The union
then changed its mind and moved to vacate the injunction. This motion
was summarily denied and the union appealed.
The union argued that the injunction should be vacated on the ground
that (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue
the injunction, or (2) continuation of the injunction was unwarranted in
equity. The court rejected the union's latter argument challenging the
equitable basis of the continuation of the injunction because the union
had openly consented to the continuation in proceedings before the district court.""5 The court agreed, however, that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to extend the injunction beyond the time the
arbitral award was confirmed. Because the power of the federal courts to
enjoin labor strikes exists only to vindicate the arbitral process, the court
held that such an injunction may not be continued beyond the final step
in the arbitration process."" Contrary to the union's argument that the
arbitration award is the final step in the arbitration process, however, the
court determined that the final step is reached when the award is judicially enforced. 8 7 Thus, the district court should have continued the injunction only until judicial enforcement of the award, through confirmation in this instance, and not until resolution of the NLRB proceedings.'"
Post-Election Investigations. In three cases before the Fifth Cir133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(4)(D) (1976).
625 F.2d at 40.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41-42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
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cuit in 1980, the court considered the duty of an NLRB Regional Director
to investigate and conduct an evidentiary hearing on objections to election misconduct. Under section 102.69(d) 139 of the Board's procedural
regulations, the Regional Director may, "in the exercise of his reasonable
discretion," hold a hearing in any case in which a party objecting to certification of the election results raises "substantial and material factual issues" with regard to the conduct of the election.140 In NLRB v.Claxton
Manufacturing Co.,1 4 1 the court held that an employer's objections to a
union's election conduct raised sufficient issues to require the Regional
Director to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
In Claxton, the employer filed a number of objections to a representation election won by the union. The Regional Director conducted an administrative investigation and, without a hearing, issued a report recommending that the Board overrule the objections and certify the union.
The Board adopted these recommendations. The company subsequently
refused to bargain with the union and the Board entered a bargaining
order. In response to the petition by the Board to enforce that order, the
company contended that due process entitled it to an evidentiary hearing
on its objections to the election. The court found in favor of the employer
and denied enforcement of the Board's order.
The court conceded that the Board has "wide discretion in determining
whether an election has been fairly conducted." 14 This discretion is limited, however, because due process requires that the Board grant a hearing to a losing party who has supplied prima facie evidence raising "substantial and material issues" concerning misconduct that would warrant
setting the election aside.14 8 In presenting its prima facie case, the objecting party must adduce "specific evidence of specific events from or
about specific people." General allegations, the court noted, do not meet
this standard.1 4 4 Once the objecting party has established its right to a
hearing by adducing prima facie evidence of substantial election misconduct, the court added, the Regional Director is not entitled to deny that
right on the basis of contrary evidence obtained by the Regional Director's ex parte investigation.'" The court dismissed as dicta any implication from its decision in NLRB v.Golden Age Beverage Co. 14 6 that the
Regional Director could resolve conflicts in the evidence against the ob139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1980).
Id.
613 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id.
415 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1969).
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jecting party in order to deny a hearing on the objections. In Golden Age,
the court noted, the court had
found that the employer's evidence did not
14 7
support a prima facie case.
In Claxton, the employer had presented affidavits to the Regional Director asserting that the union and some employees had threatened employees with physical violence, intimidation and promise of benefit. Surveying the affidavits, the court concluded that the employer had
established a prima facie case of election misconduct by the union that
was substantiated by specific evidence." The court further held that the
Regional Director had erred in basing his dismissal of the objections 14in
part on his consideration of evidence gained by ex parte investigation. '
Later in 1980, the Fifth Circuit applied its decision in Claxton to refuse, on the same grounds, to grant enforcement of the Board's order in
NLRB v. Polyflex M Co.15 In Polyflex, the Regional Director, after making an ex parte investigation, again dismissed the employer's objections to
a union's election victory. Because the employer's affidavits, which asserted, inter alia, that the union had promised to waive initiation fees for
employees joining prior to the election, raised substantial and material
issues concerning union misconduct, the court remanded the case to the
Board for a hearing on the employer's objections.151
In another case, however, the court determined that the employer's objections had failed to satisfy the specificity standards set out in Claxton,
and that as a result the Regional Director was required neither to provide
a hearing nor even to investigate the employer's objections. In NLRB v.
Dobbs House, Inc.,15s the employer delivered a letter to the Regional Director alleging generally that five named employees could verify that unlawful threats had been made by union agents. The investigator declined
to come to the plant to interview these witnesses, but requested the employer to bring the employees to the Regional Director's office. The employer was unable to persuade the employees to go to the Regional Director's office to make a statement, and, because these employees later
moved out of the region and became unavailable, no affidavits or statements of these witnesses were ever received.
In response to a petition to enforce the Board's bargaining order, the
employer argued that the Regional Director was obligated to investigate
the employer's objections and that, as part of this obligation, the Regional Director should have come to the employer's plant to interview the
147.

613 F.2d at 1367.

148. Id. at 1371-73.

149. Id.
150. 622 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 131.
152. 613 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1980).
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witnesses. The court held that, because the employer's letter to the Regional Director had failed to allege any specific events concerning specific
people with respect to the alleged union threats, the Regional Director
was not required to conduct an investigation. 5 8 The court distinguished
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Electronic Components Corp. v. NLRB,'"
that a Regional Director is obligated "to communicate with the witnesses,
question them about specific events, and follow-up any leads developed,""8 because the employer in that case had satisfied the specificity
requirement in its objections.'"
Limitation of Actions. Under section 10(b) of the NLRA, "no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more
than six months prior to the filing of a charge with the Board. .... ,,.17
Two cases before the court during 1980 presented the problem of determining whether alleged unfair labor practices occurred during this sixmonth period. In NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp.,'" the court held that
an employer who shuts down a portion of his business in retaliation for
union activity commits a separate and independent unfair labor practice
when it reopens the plant and refuses to hire former pro-union employees. 18 9 The employer in Southern Plasma closed a portion of its operation, the plasma donor lab, after the employees decided to form a union.
This action was committed outside the six-month period preceding the
former employees' filing of an unfair labor practice charge. Six days after
the closing of the lab, however, the employer reopened the lab with new
employees and refused to rehire the former employees. The charge was
filed in timely fashion with regard to the refusal to rehire. The court concluded that the employer's unfair labor practice was committed when it
discriminated against the former pro-union employees, and that, because
this action occurred within the six-month period preceding the filing of
charges, the employer's unfair labor practice was actionable.160
In NLRB v. Preston H. Haskell Co.,116 a majority of the panel determined that an employer's refusal to sign an agreement between a multiemployer association and a union after the employer's earlier attempt to
withdraw from the association was a separate act within the six-month
limitations period. The employer had first indicated its withdrawal from
153.

Id. at 1259-60.
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157.
158.
159.
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161.

546 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1093.
613 F.2d at 1259 n.5.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
626 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1295-96.
Id. at 1292-93.
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the association by its failure to return a card authorizing the association
to act on its behalf during negotiations. The employer subsequently attended a series of bargaining sessions between the association and the
unions during the early part of 1976. When negotiations broke down on
April 6, 1976, the employer wrote to the association and the various unions stating that it was immediately withdrawing from the association.
Negotiations were later renewed, and when the association finally reached
an agreement with the unions on April 30, the company refused to execute the agreement. The unions filed unfair labor practice charges against
the company on October 29, 1976, charging that the refusal to execute the
agreement was an illegal refusal to bargain.
Judge Gee held that the unions had failed to assert an unfair labor
practice within the six-month limitations period of section 10(b). 16' Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Local Lodge No. 1424 International Association of Machinists v. NLRB (Bryan Manufacturing),'"
Judge Gee applied the rule that, although conduct outside the six-month
period may be relevant as evidence to shed light on matters occurring
within the six-month limitations period, an action is barred where conduct occurring within the limitations period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice.' " In Bryan Manufacturing, the Supreme Court had held that a
complaint against continued enforcement of a union security clause, on
grounds that the union lacked majority status when the collective bargaining agreement was adopted, was time barred, because "the entire
foundation of the unfair labor practice charged was the Union's timebarred lack of majority status when the original collective bargaining
agreement was signed."""
Applying Bryan Manufacturing to the facts in Preston H. Haskell,
Judge Gee concluded that the company's failure to execute the agreements, standing alone, was "wholly innocent." 1 Only by finding that the
company's putative withdrawal from the multi-employer group was in itself an unfair labor practice could the court hold that the later refusal to
execute the agreement was an unfair labor practice. 167 Thus, Judge Gee
concluded that no action could be maintained by the unions against the
company.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Thornberry disagreed with Judge Gee's
analysis of the limitations problem but agreed with the result after find162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 141-42.
362 U.S. 411 (1960).
616 F.2d at 139.
362 U.S. at 417.
616 F.2d at 141.
Id.
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ing on the merits that the union's unfair labor practice charge should
have been dismissed. Judge Thornberry found that Haskell's attempt to
withdraw from the multi-employer association was only relevant evidence
and was not the foundation of the union's unfair labor practice charge.'"
Haskell's refusal to sign the agreement bargained by the multi-employer
group, Judge Thornberry contended, would have been a refusal to bargain
collectively if the agreement actually had been negotiated on Haskell's
behalf. 69 Judge Thornberry concurred in the result with Judge Gee, however, on the ground that Haskell had never bound itself to a course of
group bargaining and therefore the refusal to execute an agreement to
which the company was never bound did not constitute an unfair labor
70
practice.1
Dissenting, Judge Hatchett agreed with Judge Thornberry that the
union's unfair labor practice charge was not time barred and determined
on the merits that Haskell was a member of the multi-employer association.' 71 Judge Hatchett did not, however, explain the basis for his disagreement with Judge Thornberry's conclusion that Haskell had never
unequivocally bound itself to a course of group bargaining.
II.

DuTY

OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

In Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc.,'7 2 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that a union had breached its duty of fair representation by withdrawing a grievance filed on behalf of the plaintiffemployee before submitting the grievance to arbitration. Citing the accepted principle that a breach of the duty of fair representation cannot be
based on the trial court's view regarding the probability of success on the
merits of a grievance, 178 the court noted that much of the district court's
decision was indeed based on an independent examination of the
probability of success.' 7' The court cited undisputed evidence that the
union investigated the employee's discharge, pressed the grievance
through the second and third steps of the contractual procedure, and considered all the facts and arguments for and against arbitration prior to
withdrawing the grievance. 7 6 These actions demonstrated the union's serious consideration of the plaintiff's claim.'17 The court also rejected the
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 145-46.
609 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1126. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192-93 (1967).
609 F.2d at 1126.
Id. at 1128.
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district court's conclusion that the union had evidenced its bad faith by
failing to give notice to the plaintiff of the third-step meeting at which
the union decided to withdraw the grievance, or by the hostile attitude of
a union representative displayed toward the plaintiff at trial. 77 The latter
factor, the court noted, was relevant to the credibility of the union
witness but
was not in itself sufficient to uphold a finding of union
7 8
hostility.

In another action under section 301 of the NLRA, 1 7' Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,'" the court held that the plaintiff had not been deprived of a fair arbitration hearing of his grievance by virtue of his inability to afford a copy of the hearing transcript for preparation of his brief
to the arbitrator after the hearing. The court noted that the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate on appeal that his lack of access to the transcript
denied him a fundamentally fair hearing, which was all that was required
of the arbitration proceeding.'18 The court also held that the union's failure to provide the plaintiff with a hearing transcript was not arbitrary,
discriminatory or in bad faith.1''
In an action brought under the Railway Labor Act,' 8' the court held
that a union had not breached its duty of fair representation by its designation of union members to the Board of Adjustment that decided a nonmember's grievance. The plaintiff in Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc.'"
was a pilot for Southern Airways who was discharged in 1969 on the basis
of written charges of pilot incompetence. Plaintiff was not a member of
the union and in fact had worked as a pilot for Southern during a union
sanctioned strike against the airline between 1960 and 1962. After his discharge, Wells retained his own counsel and made no request to the union
for assistance. In conformity with the requirements of the Railway Labor
Act' 85 and the collective bargaining agreement between Southern and the
union, the plaintiff's grievance was heard by a five-person System Board
of Adjustment. The System Board found that plaintiffs discharge was
justified, and plaintiff. challenged this determination in district court.
After reviewing the System Board's procedure, the district court found
that Wells had been denied due process and ordered another hearing.
On the first appeal from the district court, the Fifth Circuit reversed,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 1127.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
625 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1290-91.
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 166 (1980).
See 45 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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holding that the System Board hearing comported with due process.' s
The court remanded the case to the district court, however, for a determination of plaintiff's contention that the union had breached its duty of
fair representation, because that claim was wholly outside the jurisdiction
of a System Board of Adjustment. On remand, the district court found
that the union had breached this duty by failing to designate as its representatives to the System Board persons who were not union members and
thus not "institutionally" hostile to plaintiff. 87
On appeal the Fifth Circuit again reversed. Conceding that bias or hostility on the part of any member of a System Board would amount to a
denial of due process, the court held that its earlier decision that plaintiff
had not been denied a due process hearing was the law of the case and
was dispositive of the question whether plaintiff was injured by the
union's choice of System Board representatives.'"
III.

ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AwARDs

In Alabama Power Co. v. Local Union No. 391, InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers,189 the Fifth Circuit held that a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator on the question of
whether a grievance properly has been submitted to arbitration under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. Employee-Moncrief was suspended from his employment from Alabama Power after he was involved
in a shooting incident with the local police. On his behalf, the union filed
a grievance which was denied by the company at each stage of the contractual grievance procedure.
After the union requested arbitration, but before the commencement of
the arbitration, Moncrief was indicted and Alabama Power converted his
suspension into a discharge. A dispute then arose over whether Alabama
Power had assented to a waiver of the necessity for the filing of a separate
grievance as to Moncrief's discharge. At arbitration, Alabama Power contended that only the issue of Montcrief's suspension was before the arbitrator because the union had failed to file a separate grievance concerning
Moncrief's discharge. The arbitrator, however, agreed with the union that
the suspension grievance had been automatically converted into a discharge grievance because both the suspension and the discharge arose
from the same event.
Alabama Power brought an action for a declaratory judgment in order
186. Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 517 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
914 (1976).
187. 616 F.2d at 109.
188. Id. at 110-11.
189. 612 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1980).
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to set aside the arbitration award. The district court found that the grievance had not been converted automatically into a discharge grievance,
and that Alabama Power had not waived the requirement that the union
file a separate grievance over the discharge. Thus, the district court
declared the arbitrator's award void on the ground that the arbitrator
lacked jurisdiction over the issue of Moncrief's discharge.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, citing as the basis for its decision the Supreme Court's decision in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston1" that a
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator on questions of "procedural arbitrability." 191 Alabama Power attempted to distinguish John Wiley & Sons on the basis that, in the instant case, no
grievance had been filed and Alabama Power had not agreed to submit
the issue of discharge to arbitration. Rejecting the importance of this distinction, the court interpreted John Wiley & Sons to hold that, "if the
subject matter of the dispute is arguably arbitrable.

.

., then it is for the

arbitrator to decide whether or not the dispute may be arbitrated." 1 2
In another action to enforce an arbitration award, the Fifth Circuit rejected an employer's contention that an arbitration award should be denied enforcement as contrary to the public policy favoring the elimination
of health hazards from the work environment. The employer in JohnsManville Sales Corp. v. International Association of Machinists, Local
Lodge 1609,193 had spent millions of dollars to reduce or eliminate the
danger of asbestos fibers circulating in the air by installing air quality
control devices and taking other steps to reduce air pollution in its plant
in conformity with federal standards. Consequently, the risk of inhalation
of asbestos was reduced to an insignificant level except for those employees who smoked. To reduce the danger to smokers, Johns-Manville implemented a program to assist employees in renouncing smoking. In addition, Johns-Manvile adopted a rule, enforced by escalating disciplinary
sanctions, prohibiting smoking on company property. Upon the fifth violation, the penalty was discharge.
The union filed a grievance, claiming that the imposition of the nosmoking rule violated the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance
reached arbitration, and the arbitrator held that although the no-smoking
rule was invalid, Johns-Manville "should" adopt a rule permitting smoking during work breaks in specially designated areas.'" In JohnsManville's action in district court to set the arbitration award aside, the
union stipulated that it would accept as mandatory that part of the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

376 U.S. 543 (1964).
612 F.2d at 962.
Id. at 963.
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award stating that Johns-Manville should adopt a rule confining smoking
to designated areas.
The district court refused to set the award aside, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Johns-Manville argued on appeal that public policy favored the
elimination of health hazards from the work environment, and that because its no-smoking rule furthered that policy, the arbitration award
should be set aside. The court recognized that an arbitration award
should not be enforced if the result would be to require a violation of law,
but it noted that arbitration awards are rarely set aside for violation of
general public policy. 1 "1Two cases cited by Johns-Manville'" involved
the setting aside of awards that hindered the reporting, prosecution or
punishment of violations of the law, making these cases closely akin to
those refusing enforcement to awards requiring violation of the law. 1 ' A
third case cited by Johns-Manville'" involved the Ninth Circuit's refusal
to enforce an award that would have created a serious danger to the
health and safety of third persons. By contrast, the court reasoned, the
danger of smoking is principally to the smoker, and any incidental danger
to the non-smoker could be alleviated by the creation of special smoking
areas.'" The court concluded that, as there appeared to be no public
policy against
smoking in asbestos plants, the arbitration award should be
0
20

enforced.

IV.

A.

INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS

Section 301 Jurisdiction.

Under section 301 of the NLRA,20 ' an action may be brought for the
violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization in
any federal court having jurisdiction of the parties. In Alexander v. International Union of Operating Engineers,0 2 the Fifth Circuit held that
section 301 may in some instances provide a basis for jurisdiction in an
action brought by individual union members against a local and international union for breach of the international's constitution. The case concerned the signing of a collective bargaining agreement by the local
195. Id. at 759.
196. See Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 Ill. 2d 412, 24 In.
Dec. 843, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sanford, 540 S.W.2d 478
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
197. 621 F.2d at 759.
198. World Airways, Inc. v. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978).
199. 621 F.2d at 759.
200. Id. at 759-60.
201. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
202. 624 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980).
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union's business agent on behalf of the local union without approval from
the local's membership in derogation of a section in the international's
constitution requiring membership approval. Although other circuit
courts had reached differing conclusions when confronted with the issue
of whether a violation of a union constitution provides a basis for section
301 jurisdiction, 08 the court found that a review of those cases established that the conflict in authority was "one of result and not one of
method of analysis."' "
The court noted that those cases finding no section 301 jurisdiction in
disputes over union constitutions did so on the ground that the dispute
was an intra-union matter that did not pose a threat to industrial
peace. 0 6 Those cases which extended section 301 jurisdiction to disputes
over union constitutions found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a
genuine impact on industrial peace.'" Thus, the court held, whether section 301 confers jurisdiction turns on whether the alleged violation creates a threat to industrial peace or has a significant impact upon labormanagement relations.'10 Because the plaintiffs in Alexander failed to allege any threat to industrial peace or impact upon labor-management relations resulting from the local union's violation of the international's
constitution, the cotirt held that the plaintiffs' section 301 complaint was
properly dismissed.'"
B. Election of Officers.
In Marshall v. Local 1402, International Longshoremen's Association,'"° the Fifth Circuit overturned a union's by-law providing that all
candidates for office must have attended, or have been excused from attending, at least one of two meetings held each month for each of the
twelve months preceding nomination. The excuse provisions required no
reason for absence. To obtain an excuse, a member was required only to
notify the union office in advance of a scheduled meeting. Under this procedure, however, only 6.3 percent of the union members were eligible for
203. Compare Stelling v. IBEW Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1382-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1978); Trail v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 542 F.2d 961, 966-67 (6th Cir.
1976); 1199 DC, Nat'l Union of Hosp.& Health Care Employees v. National Union of Hosp.
& Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1976) with Abramis v. Carrier
Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1247-49 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971); Parks v.
IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 914-17 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
204. 624 F.2d at 1238.
205. Id.
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office.
The court held that the by-law violated section 401(e) of the Labor'
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,110 which requires that qualifications for office must be "reasonable." While the court agreed, that the
by-law imposed a minimal burden on members by virtue of the liberal
excuse provisions, the court found the by-law nonetheless impermissible
because of its effect on the democratic processes of the union government.
The liberal excuse provisions only served to establish that the by-law had
no legitimate purpose. 1 On the other hand, the court noted, the effect of
the rule was to exclude from eligibility members who had not requested
excuses during the early months because they had not initially anticipated their later desire to run for office. 1'
V.

A.

WAGE AND HOUR CASES

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

In Reeves v. InternationalTelephone & Telegraph Corp.,213 the Fifth
Circuit gave retroactive effect to the 1977 amendment 21 4 to section
15(a)(3) of the FLSA.21 5 This amendment created a private cause of ac-

tion for retaliation in employment as a result of filing a complaint under
the FLSA. In Reeves, the plaintiff-employee instituted an action in federal court under section 15(a)(3) after he was discharged for having filed a
complaint with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor
in 1967. The company's principal argument on appeal from a judgment
for the plaintiff was that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the action because no private right of action under section 15(a)(3) existed when Reeves' suite was filed in 1967, and that the 1977 amendments
creating such a private cause of action should not be applied retroactively. In agreement with the Sixth Circuit,' the court held that under
the "well-established principle" that a court must apply the law in effect
at the time of its decision, the 1977 amendments were applicable to cases
pending before the court after 1977.111 In addition, the court cited the
rule that "amendments . . . which are procedural and affect only reme-

210.

29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976).

211. 617 F.2d at 98.
212. Id. at 99.
213. 616 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
214. Act of Nov. 1, 1977, Pub. L. 95-151, § 10, 91 Stat. 1252, codified at 29 U.S.C.
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215. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976).
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Davis-Bacon Act

In North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council v. Goldschmidt,2 9 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Davis-Bacon Act 2 0 is applicable to a project that federal agencies and the builder anticipate will
receive federal funding, even though federal funds have not been applied
for or authorized at the time of bid opening. In Goldschmidt, the court
applied the Davis-Bacon Act to an airport construction project for which
the City of Atlanta had submitted a "pre-application" for federal assistance prior to receiving bids. All parties involved in the project understood that federal funds would be required to complete the project, and
all parties anticipated that funds would be authorized under the Airport
and Airway Development Act.22 1 Thus, the Davis-Bacon Act and the regulations issued pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act applied with regard to
initial wage rate determinations and any subsequent variations.
In United States v. Capelletti Brothers, Inc.,2 2 the Fifth Circuit held
that there is no implied private right of action under the Davis-Bacon
Act. Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in McDaniel v. University of Chicago'" that "implying a private right of action in the DavisBacon Act is necessary to effectuate the intention of Congress,'
the
court held that under the factors established by the Supreme Court in
Cort v. Ash,125 a private remedy was not implicit in the Davis-Bacon Act.
The first Cort factor is "whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted. ' ""0 The court noted that, in applying this factor, the Supreme Court has considered not only whether
the statute was intended to benefit a particular class but also whether the
duty-creating language of the statute indicates that Congress intended to
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.2 2 Although wage earners
such as the individual plaintiffs in Capelletti were unquestionably the
principal beneficiaries of the Davis-Bacon Act, the court noted that the
language of the Act does not create a right for the benefitted class but
instead imposes only a duty on federal agencies to insure that certain
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
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621 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1980).
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provisions are included in federal contracts.'"
The second Cort factor is legislative intent. The court found with regard to this factor that the Davis-Bacon Act creates an elaborate enforcement scheme with the implication that the express enforcement provisions provide the exclusive means of enforcement.'" Regarding the third
Cort factor, legislative scheme, the court found that the implication of a
private right of action is not "necessary" to effectuate the purposes of the
Act, because there was not evidence that the administrative relief available under the Act was ineffective.' " The court found that the fourth
Cort factor, whether implying a private federal remedy would intrude on
an area traditionally of state concern, did not in itself preclude creation
of a private remedy under the Davis-Bacon Act." " The court concluded,
however, that in view of the substantial considerations against implying a
private right of action, the district court properly dismissed the individual plaintiff's complaint."'
VI.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

In three cases decided under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(the Act), " s the court took the Act's overseer, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), to task over the interpretation of its
own rules and its failure to follow proper administrative procedure. In
Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. OSHA,'" the court upheld OSHA's action but
charged, "[t]his case abounds with examples of bureaucratic ineptness." Under section 6(a) of the Act,"" the Secretary of Labor was empowered for a period of two years from the effective date of the Act to
circumvent the normal notice and comment rule-making procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act" 7 and to promulgate as a standard
under the Act any "national consensus standard" and any "established
Federal Standard.'
At the time the Act became effective, there were
two federal standards in existence relating to occupational exposure to
chlorine gas-a strict 1968 standard and a more liberal 1970 standard.
Section 6(a) required that, in choosing between two conflicting federal
228.
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standards, the Secretary should promulgate the standard that best protected the safety or health of the affected employees. One provision of
chlorine gas regulations promulgated under the Act, however, referred to
the liberal 1970 air contaminants standard as the adopted standard, while
another provision referred to the-strict 1968 standard as the source of the
8
adopted standard.3'
Although the Secretary twice attempted to rectify confusion surrounding many of the regulations issued pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act, the
conflicting regulations concerning chlorine gas remained in force.240 Moreover, until 1978, citations issued against employees by the Secretary for
violations 41of the chlorine regulations were based on the liberal 1970
standard.

In 1978, seven and a half years after the regulations were first published and long after the two-year limit for promulgation without resort
to normal procedure, the Secretary, without following the normal rulemaking procedure, amended the chlorine regulations to reflect the strict
1968 federal standard. The Secretary stated that the "corrections" did
not "establish, modify or revoke substantive rights and obligations," and
that therefore the normally required public notice and comment procedures were unnecessary."' The Chlorine Institute petitioned the Fifth
Circuit for review of OSHA's action, arguing that the "correction" was in
fact a substantive amendment and pointing to OSHA's own reliance on
the liberal 1970 standards in previous enforcement proceedings. After reproving OSHA for its ineptitude, the court reluctantly agreed with OSHA
that the changes in the chlorine regulations were only corrections of a
ministerial error, not requiring public notice and comment procedures.24
The court noted that the error was obvious on the face of the original
regulations, and that the stricter standard must have been intended as
the applicable standard since the choice of the stricter standard was required under the Act.2"
In two other cases decided under the Act, OSHA's reliance on and enforcement of "general standards" of safety, rather than its own regulations of specific application, resulted in reversals by the court of the
OSHA's enforcement orders against employers. In R. L. Sanders Roofing
Co. v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission,"5 a citation
was issued against the R. L. Sanders Roofing Co. after one of Sanders'
239.
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employees fell from the flat roof of the building on which he was working.
The basis of the citation was that Sanders had failed to erect a guardrail
or protective platform around the perimeter of the roof, in violation of
the general duty under section 5(a)(1) of the Act' to protect employees
from certain "recognized hazards." The company contested the citation,
and, after a hearing on a complaint filed by the Secretary of Labor, the
administrative law judge found that the company had not violated the
general duty clause. The decision of the administrative law judge was reversed by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the
Commission), and Sanders petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the
Commission's order.
The primary issue in Sanders was whether the Company could be
found in violation of the general duty clause when the specific regulations
regarding roofs did not require the company to provide a guardrail or
protective platform under the circumstances. Section 1926.451(u)(3) of
OSHA's regulations" 7 requires the installation of a protective platform
below the working area of any roof "with a slope greater than 4 inches in
12 inches.. .

."

The Secretary of Labor previously had interpreted this

regulation to mean that roofs having a lesser slope did not present a substantial danger of falls."O The Commission took the position that this
regulation exempted only slightly sloped roofs, but not fiat roofs, because
a fiat roof is not sloped at all. The court, resorting to common sense,
found the Commission's
interpretation contrary to reason and fundamen4
tal fairness.' '

The court also rejected the Commission's analysis of the case under the
general duty clause. Rather than judging Sanders' conduct under the
standards of the roofing roofing industry, the Commission had applied
the standards of the construction industry pertaining to platforms and
floors. The court found the Commission's reasoning unsupportable. Recalling Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission,'" in which the court had admonished the Commission that
"a roof is not a floor," 1 the court found that the applicable standard was
that of the roofing industry as to work on roofs, and that this standard
required neither guardrails nor protective platforms around fiat roofs.' 5

In McLean-Behm Steel Erectors,Inc. v. OccupationalSafety & Health
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

29 U.S.C, § 654(a)(1) (1976).
29 C.F.R, § 1926.451 (U)(3) (1980).
See 37 Fed. Reg. 25712 (1972).
620 F.2d at 100.
528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 647.
620 F.2d at 100-01.
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Review Commission,2 5 8 the Secretary issued a citation against the employer for failure to abide by a general construction safety regulation requiring employers to provide personal protective equipment to employees
working under hazardous conditions.'" At the administrative hearing, the
employer moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that a more specific
safety regulation 25 applicable to the employer's activity, steel erection,
made the general safety regulation inapplicable. Under section
1910.5(c)(1) of OSHA's regulations,'" a particular standard specifically
applicable prevails over any general standard that might otherwise be applicable. The employer also took the position, however, that it was prepared to argue defenses only to the general regulation to which the citation referred and not to the specific regulation. The Secretary expressly
declined to move for amendment of the citation, and the administrative
law judge reserved judgment on the employer's motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, after the hearing, the administrative law judge sua sponte
amended the citation to charge a violation of the specific regulation and
found the employer to be in violation of this regulation.
The administrative law judge's decision was affirmed by the Commission, .but the Fifth Circuit reversed. While the court agreed that the specific standards for steel erection superseded the general standards, the
court held that amendment of the citation was proper only if violation of
the specific regulations had been tried by express or implied consent.25
The Secretary urged that the employer's failure to object to evidence admitted during the hearing was an implied consent to try the issue of the
employer's violation of the specific regulation, because the evidence was
relevant to both the general and the specific regulation. Contrasting the
Secretary's refusal to request amendment at the hearing with the Secretary's position on appeal, the court responded, "Such a quick reversal of
direction would be more appropriate on a football field . . . ."I" The
court cited established law that the admission of evidence relevant to
both pleaded and unpleaded issues does not alone imply consent to try
the impleaded issue.'5 Thus, the Secretary's belated attempt to make the
specific regulations the basis of the enforcement proceedings was
disapproved.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

608 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1979).
29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b)(1)(ii) (1980).
29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(1) (1980).
608 F.2d at 582.
Id.
Id.
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MISCELLANEOUS--EMPLOYEE RESERVE OBLIGATIONS

Under the Vietnam Era Readjustment Act of 1974 ("VERA"),2 60 an
employer may not deny an employee any "incident or advantage of employment" as a result of that employee's reserve obligations. In West v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.,261 the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's denial
of a forty-hour workweek to employees absent on weekend training duty
with the National Guard was an illegal denial of an "incident or advantage of employment," when the applicable collective bargaining agreement guaranteed each employee forty hours of work during any week in
which he was not absent or tardy. Safeway followed a policy which provided that employees absent because of attendance at weekend reserve
training sessions fell within the exception to the forty-hour workweek
guaranty based on their absence for that week. In an action to enforce the
forty-hour workweek provision of the collective bargaining agreement,
plaintiff West argued that Safeway's policy regarding reserve absences
was a denial of "an incident or advantage of employment because of a
Reserve obligation," in violation of VERA. The district court dismissed
the complaint but the Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal.
Safeway argued on appeal that the rule regarding reserve absences did
not "cut down" employee benefits because the guarantee of a full workweek was conditional and not absolute under the collective bargaining
agreement. 2 s The court replied that if such a defense were acceptable,
the protection afforded reservists by VERA would be effectively annulled.26 Thus, the court held, VERA must be construed to require that
employers treat reservists as "constructively present" during their reserve
duty.'4

260.
261.
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264.

38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1976).
609 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 150.

